The Law, It's Alive!

Some peculiar behaviors have been observed in the Beis Midrash

Photo by camilo jimenez on Unsplash

This is going to be somewhat subtle, so bear with me.

The reasonable default position that Ash is assuming is that halacha is basically a legal system which can employ sophisticated legal constructs and legal fictions (“treat it as if”), so there is no need to invoke any kind of abstract existential dimension to halacha. I hope the bombastic example of פסולי מוקדשין was sufficient to make the case that at least at times, it is clear that halacha goes way beyond legal fiction and enters the realm of what I will now call “non-empirical realities”. Using the phrase “Ontological reality” seems to be confusing the message I want to get across.

I believe there is totally different kind of distinction that can be made between halacha and the standard concept of a legal system.

I imagine rules of pure procedural law as operating in a completely linear fashion. It starts here and ends there. Laws interact with one another in very 2-dimensional ways—it is overridden by some laws here and it overrides other laws there. Kind of like traffic law, where there is a hierarchy of rules of right-of-way: all cars have to yield to pedestrians, and some cars have to yield to other cars on the road depending on their position on the road, emergency vehicles and police have their own special overriding privileges, etc.

But when I look at some halachos, I get the feeling that there is actually a ‘living’ quality to them. We find that halacha acts sort of autonomously. Sounds scary, no?

Read what the Rambam says in Moreh Book III Chapter 34 about halacha:

For the Law is a divine institution, and [in order to understand its operation] we must consider how in Nature the various forces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases they cause also injury. This is clear from what has been said by ourselves as well as by others. We must consequently not be surprised when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every individual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the instruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive from the specific forms in Nature all that they require. For all this comes from one God, is the result of one act; “they are all given from one shepherd” (Eccles. xii.)

This entire chapter was crucial in responding to Binyomin Zev Wolf’s recent post highlighting halacha-generated misery. But this excerpt reveals a tremendously important principle about halacha. It operates like LAWS OF NATURE.

(The Rambam here actually implies it operates like laws of Biology which has very interesting implications which may be explored in the future.)

Perhaps the examples below will best illustrate what I’m trying to communicate.

One clear example is התפשטות הקדושה. When you try to consecrate a specific limb of an animal, or be מקדש half a woman, the kedusha will spontaneously expand to encompass the entire individual (as long as there is nothing impeding it).¹ This doesn’t happen when it comes to property ownership of animals or slaves in halacha. When you want to acquire a part of something, the ownership doesn’t spontaneously spread to encompass the entire object.²

So we see that הקדש has a certain quality—it spreads of its own accord!

And this spreading even takes place against the wishes of the person bestowing the הקדש!

For instance, according to Rebbe Meir, when the owner of an animal wants to bestow two forms of קדושת מזבח on a single animal, and he utters both types of קדושה in the same sentence, the name of the first type of קדושה that he utters in the sentence will be chal first, which, against the wishes of the owner, takes over the entire animal and prevents the second type of קדושה from being chal afterward. It’s call תופס לשון ראשון.³ That’s right. The kedusha ‘grabs’ the first type that was uttered and immediately spreads to block the second type, even though the owner said both in one sentence in a way that showed he wanted both types to be chal.

I don’t think secular legal systems have qualities that behave this way. (Of course, you can purposely design a law to behave any way you want it to, but that would be a capricious and frivolous thing to do. I’m talking about contrasting the halachic system with a rational, utilitarian, man-made legal system.)

A more subtle example of 3-dimensional quality in halacha is something I came across in Bechoros.

Most of us are familiar with two forms of הקדש: There is קדושת מזבח and קדושת בדק הבית. Both types can be bestowed on animals, but the former creates a קדושת הגוף while the latter only creates קדושת ממון. The main difference between them is that kedushah of קדושת הגוף cannot be redeemed with money and returned back to its original non-sacred status. It has to be offered on the מזבח unless it becomes disqualified. And even when it gets disqualified through obtaining a severe blemish and can be redeemed, certain traces of קדושת הגוף still remain—as Rashi informed us in the previous post.

But there is a third kind of הקדש: It is called מקדיש דמים למזבח where the קדושת דמים of any object or animal is made specifically to be sold, with the proceeds used to purchase an animal that can be offered on the מזבח.

The interesting thing is that when someone applies הקדש דמים למזבח to an unblemished animal that can potentially be offered on the מזבח, the type of קדושה chal on this animal automatically becomes full קדושת מזבח! It can’t be sold (unless it acquires a blemish making it פסולי מוקדשין). Again, this happens even against the owner’s wishes. (Again, more autonomous behavior.)

But if הקדש דמים למזבח was applied to an animal already with a blemish beforehand which cannot be offered on the מזבח, then the kedusha remains in the form of קדושת דמים למזבח that the owner intended, and it can be sold as is— with the proceeds going towards an unblemished animal for the מזבח.

With these facts in mind, let’s examine the following case of the gemara in Bechoros daf 14b:

Let’s say this blemished animal which the owner bestowed קדושת דמים למזבח upon, then gave birth to unblemished offspring. This offspring will naturally inherit the קדושת דמים למזבח of its mother. But remember that this animal is unblemished. Based on what we’ve learned about this situation, the קדושת דמים למזבח on this unblemished animal should automatically convert itself into direct קדושת מזבח, right? It should not be redeemable without first getting a blemish and be rendered פסולי מוקדשין. That is what logic would dictate.

But the gemara says no.

המתפיס בעלי מומין קבועין לגבי מזבח וילדו ימכרו ואין צריכין מום שאין קדושה חלה עליהן שלא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר טעמא שלא יהא טפל חמור מן העיקר אבל הקדיש זכר לדמיו קדוש קדושת הגוף

The gemara says that because this unblemished animal was born from a blemished animal, the קדושת דמים למזבח that it receives from its mother will allow it to be sold immediately— without any blemish!

It seems to me that what’s happening here is that the קדושה being passed to the unblemished offspring retains the “inherited flavor” of its blemished origins and prevents the normal process from occurring. The blemished mother’s kedusha allows the unblemished offspring to be sold as is.

Laws don’t have “inherited flavors”, but halachos do.

1. Rashi and Tosfos Kiddushin 7a

2. Tosfos Kiddushin 7b: חצייך בפרוטה וחצייך בפרוטה. ואם תאמר אמאי לא יועיל והא לא אמר לעיל דלא פשטו קידושין בכולה אלא משום דאיכא דעת אחרת ואינה מתרצה אלא למה ששומעת אבל אם היינו יודעים שמתרצה בכולה פשטו קידושין בכולה והכא גלי דעתה שמתרצה בכולה וי''ל דאי הוי מיירי דאמר לה בלשון קידושין אין ה''נ דהוו פשטו קידושין בכולה אבל הכא איירי דאמר לה הרי את מאורסת לי או בחד מהני לישני דלעיל (דף ו.):

3. Temurah 26a, Zevachim 30a; See Rashi there: אבל הכא דאמר תמורת עולה ושלמים חד דיבורא הוא ותרוייהו חיילי או דלמא תפוס לשון ראשון לעולם ופשטה קדושת עולה בכולה ותו לא אתו שלמים וחיילי: לחצות מהו. את''ל פשטה קדושת עולה בכולה אמר הרי (זו) בהמה זו לחצות לעולה ושלמים מאי האי חד דיבורא הוא ואין זה חל בלא זה או דלמא כיון דפשטה בפלגא פשטה בכולה ולא אתו שלמים וחיילי: